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Abstract 
The ability to imperfectly but robustly enumerate a set of 
alternatives  manifests  itself  in  many  human  activities.  
However,  many  cognitive  models  have  fundamental 
difficulties with this task, which often leads to degenerate 
behavior.  The primary source of this problem is the conflict 
between  mechanisms  of  long-term  reinforcement  and  the 
need for short-term inhibition of recent items.  Our analysis 
of a pair of pervasive domains of human activity finds that 
the long-term reinforcement process is balanced by a short-
term  inhibition.    We  have  implemented  this  empirical 
finding  in  a  variation  of  the  knowledge  reinforcement 
equation of the ACT-R architecture.  This new mechanism 
not only prevents degenerate behavior in memory retrieval, 
but also emerges as a source of the power law distribution 
observed in the environment, supporting the proposition that 
the power law distribution arises from the interaction of the 
environment and cognition itself. 
Keywords:  Cognitive  Architectures,  Bayesian  Learning, 
Human Memory, Power Law of Learning. 
Introduction 
A  key  aspect  of  many  cognitive  tasks,  including 
planning  and  game  playing,  involves  sequentially 
examining  and  evaluating  a  number  of  possible  options.  
Many everyday tasks also have that characteristic, such as 
attempting to name all fifty states of the United States, or 
all members of one’s research group. 
Such  enumeration  is  seldom  exhaustive  and 
unstructured.    For  instance,  even  (or  especially)  chess 
grandmasters seldom evaluate more than a few potential 
moves  in  any  given  position.    Also,  people’s  ability  to 
enumerate large sets of objects also tends to be limited to a 
small number of items before repetition sets in, unless they 
resort  to  domain-specific  strategies  (e.g.,  relying  on 
geographical or alphabetical order to name the 50 states). 
However, as limited as this enumeration capacity might 
be, it also turns out to be highly pervasive and problematic 
for many current computational models of cognition. Many 
modern  cognitive  architectures  and  frameworks,  unlike 
earlier  models  such  as  production  systems  (e.g., 
McDermott & Forgy, 1978), do not include explicit control 
mechanisms  such  as  refraction,  a  mechanism  that 
temporarily prevents the reapplication of a just-performed 
action, such as retrieving a specific piece of information.  
Even more problematic, some of those architectures, e.g., 
ACT-R  (Anderson  &  Lebiere,  1998;  Anderson  et  al., 
2004),  include  mechanisms  that  reinforce  a  piece  of 
information after it has been accessed, making it even more 
likely  to  be  accessed  in  the  future.    Young  (2003)  has 
pointed out that the lack of refraction, together with those 
reinforcement  mechanisms,  can  lead  to  pathological 
behaviors such as out-of-control looping where one piece 
of  knowledge  becomes  so  active  that  it  is  constantly 
retrieved at the expense of others. 
This  problem  has  also  occurred  in  even  more  serious 
form  in  the  development  of  higher-level  languages  that 
include  implicit  or  explicit  retrieval  loops  for  checking 
logical  conditions  often  involving  universal  quantifiers 
(Jones, Crossman, Lebiere, & Best, 2006; Jones, Lebiere, 
& Crossman, 2007).  Nested loops are particularly difficult 
to deal with because they invalidate many of the potential 
attempts to deal with the problem.  Of course, this kind of 
processing  is  cognitively  very  difficult,  and  people 
certainly don't perform it perfectly or completely, but they 
usually  manage  to  accomplish  the  task  to  some  extent 
while  avoiding  the  pathological  behavior  often  exhibited 
by  the  cognitive  models.    While  modelers  can  often 
prevent such behavior by carefully crafting their models to 
imbed clever strategies reflecting their meta-knowledge of 
the  task,  such  knowledge  engineering  methods  lack 
cognitive  plausibility.    They  also  contribute  to  the 
brittleness and lack of portability of cognitive models when 
they are transferred to real world situations that lack the 
predictability, static nature, constrained scale, and limited 
complexity of laboratory experiments. 
What is needed is an understanding of the human ability 
to enumerate a limited set of alternatives.  Specifically, we 
need  to  analyze  the  environmental,  cognitive  and  neural 
constraints that allow us to balance the long-term desire to 
reinforce  more  commonly  accessed  items  to  facilitate 
future retrievals together with the short-term need to avoid 
iterated  retrievals  that  lead  to  looping  behavior.  These 
constraints, of course, must include those that come from 
observing human behavior.  The constraints then need to 
be implemented in computational form that integrates with 
the other architectural mechanisms to provide the proper 
functional characteristics that allow the cognitive models 
to  display  the  same  robustness  and  adaptivity,  as  is 
commonly exhibited by human experimental participants, 
without recourse to constant engineering on the part of the 
modeler. 
2378Environment Analysis 
Following the rational analysis approach (Anderson, 1990), 
we  view  the  environment  as  the  primary  shaper  of 
cognition.    Indeed,  it  was  the  analysis  of  Anderson  & 
Schooler (1991) that led to the reinforcement mechanism 
in  ACT-R  that  is  largely  responsible  for  the  degenerate 
behavior  described  above.    The  primary  insight  of  that 
analysis was that the odds of an item appearing in many 
common  contexts  such  as  email  correspondence  or 
newspaper  headlines  increased  as  a  power  law  of 
frequency and decreased as a power law of recency.  The 
latter, in particular, provides a boost in activation after an 
item is accessed, leading to a much higher probability of 
immediate  subsequent  retrieval  unless  that  item  is 
specifically excluded, such as through explicitly marking 
conditions on retrievals or tagging by a mechanism such as 
a declarative version of visual finsts (Pylyshyn, 1989).  It is 
fair  to  ask  what  we  might  add  to  the  prior  analysis  of 
Anderson and Schooler.  Significantly, that analysis used 
domains that were not directly relevant to (or specifically 
excluded data related to) the short time scales of interest 
here.  Therefore, we will follow the same rational analysis 
methodology  in  analyzing  domains  involving  the 
consecutive access of large numbers of items, but rather 
than  exclude  items  processed  at  short  intervals,  we  will 
focus on them.  We have selected two such domains that 
are pervasive in human activity and provide large amounts 
of regular data for such an analysis: language processing 
and arithmetic computations. 
Language 
To  be  able  to  draw  broad  and  robust  conclusions,  we 
analyzed a broad array of text corpuses, from a scientific 
book  chapter  and  proposal  (about  30K  words  each)  to 
classic books such as Dickens’ “A Christmas Carol” (about 
100K words) and Joyce’s “Ulysses” (about 300K words) 
and a large section of a reference book, the Encyclopedia 
Britannica (about 300K words).  Figure 1 plots the odds of 
a given word appearing a certain number of words after its 
previous appearance (a.k.a. lag), averaged over all words 
of each text.  The plot is on a log-log scale in order to 
easily display the expected power-law relations. 
 
Figure 1: Odds of appearance as a function of lag 
As  observed,  the  relation  is  largely  invariant  of  corpus, 
with statistically insignificant variations for very short lags 
(especially 1, which reflects infrequent word repetitions).  
For lags of 10 or more, the curve is roughly linear, i.e. the 
odds  decrease  as  a  power  law  of  lag  as  in  the  original 
analysis.  However, for short lags, the odds of appearance 
gradually deviate from the power-law, with a precipitous 
decline for immediate word repetitions (i.e. lag=1).  This 
deviation can be interpreted as an inhibition of return in the 
environment  that  should  be  reflected  in  the  appropriate 
cognitive  mechanisms,  inasmuch  as  it  is  the  opposite 
dynamic to the current short-term reinforcement. 
 
Figure 2: Odds of 10 most common words 
 
We performed a more detailed analysis to rule out the 
possibility that this result was an artifact of grammatical 
rules  or  irregular  words.    Figure  2  establishes  that  the 
pattern holds for the ten most common words, albeit with 
additional  noise  resulting  from  the  smaller  sample  size.  
Those  words  should  probably  be  excluded  because  their 
syntactic roles are usually distinctive enough to result in 
procedural rather than declarative processing (if they are 
processed at all – articles are often not lexically processed).  
An important question is whether this pattern holds for less 
common  words,  and  whether  the  period  of  inhibition  is 
sensitive to word frequency.  To answer that question, we 
categorized the words by frequency of appearance. 
 
Figure 3: Odds by word frequency in Ulysses 
2379Figure 3 and 4 present a frequency analysis where words 
were  grouped  into  five  quintiles  according  to  their 
frequency in the two largest texts.  The curves for each 
quintile are parallel, capturing the frequency effects (other 
than for the first quintile of most common words at long 
lags)
1.    Both  figures,  but  especially  figure  4  (and  one 
would  expect  Britannica  to  be  more  regular  and  less 
linguistically idiosyncratic than Ulysses), establish that the 
inhibition  effect  is  not  dependent  on  word  frequency.  
Rather, the maximum odds of appearance occur around lag 
of 8-10 for all word frequencies.  This is an essential piece 
of  data  in  constraining  the  implementation  of  this 
environmental constraint in an architectural mechanism. 
 
Figure 4: Odds by word frequency in Britannica 
Arithmetic 
Just as the original analysis by Anderson and Schooler had 
demonstrated the long-term statistical patterns over a range 
of domains, it is essential for us to show that the short-term 
inhibition trends found in the language corpuses are also 
present in other environments.  As a second domain, we 
have chosen arithmetic facts for a number of reasons: it is a 
regular domain that like language is shaped by both the 
everyday world and formal schooling; it is a semi-formal 
domain  that  is  relatively  well-understood;  and  it  is  a 
domain  that  we  have  studied  and  modeled  ourselves 
(Lebiere,  1998).    Arithmetic  knowledge,  for  example,  is 
decomposed in a hierarchy of types, starting with counting 
facts  and  on  to  addition  and  multiplication.    Each 
subsequent  level  of  the  hierarchy  is  taught  sequentially 
(i.e.,  children  first  learn  to  count,  then  add,  then 
multiply…)  and  depends  upon  the  previous  ones  for 
reconstructing the current ones (i.e., addition by repeated 
counting,  multiplication  by  repeated  addition,  etc).  
Unfortunately,  knowledge  of  the  actual  statistical 
distributions  of  access  to  arithmetic  knowledge  is  not 
directly  available  in  the  same  form  as  the  language 
corpuses.  Textbooks provide one source of knowledge, but 
this source is relatively incomplete.  Instead, we decided to 
                                                             
1 This reflects, as discussed previously, the special syntactic 
role of the most common words that makes them highly likely to 
appear regularly and can be ignored for our purposes. 
rely  upon  our  validated  cognitive  model  of  the  lifetime 
learning  of  arithmetic  facts,  and  in  particular  its 
assumptions  about  the  distribution  and  frequency  of 
arithmetic facts.  To avoid being overly dependent upon 
those assumptions, however, we studied in particular the 
statistical requests generated for one type of fact (counting) 
by another type (addition).  This allowed us to reflect both 
the  statistics  (in  terms  of  the  distribution  of  addition 
problems) and the structure of the domain in terms of the 
requests  for  counting  facts  generated  in  solving  addition 
problems by backup computation.  Figure 5 displays the 
odds of a counting fact being accessed as a function of the 
lag since the previous access: 
 
Figure 5: Odds of access to counting fact as a function of 
lag in addition by repeated counting problems 
 
All the same patterns evident in Figure 1 are present: an 
initial  inhibition  for  short  lags,  maximum  odds  slightly 
short of a lag of about 8-10, then the typical power law 
decay  beyond  that.    As  for  the  language  corpuses,  we 
decided  to  break  down  these  aggregate  odds  into 
subcategories depending upon the frequencies of the facts 
accessed.  Figure 6 presents the odds for five quintiles of 
decreasing frequencies. 
 
Figure 6: Odds of counting facts by quintiles 
 
Again, the same patterns as in Figure 3 and 4 are present 
here as well: the curves for each quintile have the same 
characteristics as the aggregate curves, the maximum odds 
are reached at the same lags, and the curves are roughly 
parallel except for one.  In the language corpuses, the most 
frequent quintile was the one exhibiting a different pattern 
2380(a  more  steeply  diving  tail)  because  of  the  difficulty  to 
produce text at long lags without mentioning very common 
words (e.g., articles).  In the arithmetic corpus, the curve 
for the least frequent counting facts is the one exhibiting a 
different pattern (a flattening tail) because a few rare, large 
counting facts repeat at significantly longer lags since they 
only  occur  in  a  few,  infrequent  addition  facts.    For 
instance,  in  the  10x10  addition  table,  the  counting  fact 
stating that 18 follows 17 will only be needed for the most 
rare addition fact, 9+9, since the main statistical effect on 
fact distribution is that frequency decreases with size. 
Computational Implementation 
We now turn to implementing those findings in a cognitive 
architecture  and  combine  the  resulting  mechanism  with 
other, existing mechanisms to determine their interaction.  
We  selected  the  ACT-R  cognitive  architecture  for  this 
implementation, although the resulting mechanism should 
be  applicable  to  other  architectures.    As  mentioned 
previously, ACT-R currently uses a number of techniques 
to  prevent  out-of-control  retrieval  loops  resulting  from 
short-term boosts in activation.  A full discussion of those 
techniques is beyond the scope of this paper, but regardless 
it seemed that the solution to the problem should lay in the 
same location as its source, namely in the equation derived 
by Anderson & Schooler (1991) that describes the learning 
of the activation value of memory chunks as a function of 
history, specifically: 
€ 
Bi = log t j
−d
j=1
n
∑            Base-Level Learning Equation 
The  summation  over  all  past  n  references  to  a  chunk  i, 
implement the power law of practice while the decay of 
each reference j as a function of time since reference tj and 
decay rate d implements power law decay.  However, as 
our analysis shows, those effects are only valid over longer 
time intervals, as exemplified by the linear trend in the log-
scale graph of odds of appearance as a function of lag since 
the last appearance (e.g., see Figure 1 and 5).  In the short 
run,  within  a  lag  of  5  to  10  appearances,  there  is  a 
substantial decrease in odds of appearance that could be 
captured by a short-term inhibition mechanism.  This effect 
is  precisely  what  we  are  looking  for  to  prevent  out-of-
control reinforcement where retrieval leads to a large short-
term activation boost, which in turn leads to more retrieval, 
and so on until the system ends up completely deadlocked.  
A  short-term  inhibition  component  in  the  base-level 
activation learning equation would actually result in lower 
activation  for  the  next  retrieval(s),  which  would  prevent 
the same chunk from being retrieved again and give other 
chunks a chance of being retrieved instead.  This is exactly 
the functionality needed to implement many key patterns 
of behavior (e.g. Jones, Lebiere & Crossman, 2007) such 
as the ability of evaluating a set of alternatives. 
We  experimented  with  a  number  of  different  possible 
variations  of  the  base-level  learning  equation,  including 
power-law  and  exponential  decay  for  the  short-term 
inhibition  component  as  well  as  different  ways  of 
combining  the  traditional  reinforcement  and  the  new 
inhibition factors.  We have found the following form to be 
the most suitable in terms of both its functional properties 
and its ability to reproduce the data: 
€ 
Bi = log t j
−d
j=1
n
∑ −log 1+
tn
−ds
ts
 
 
 
 
 
     New BLL Equation 
The “1+” component of the new term is necessary to make 
sure that it has a strictly inhibitory effect, i.e. the sum is 
also greater than 1 meaning that the log is always positive. 
One can see that the new inhibitory term added is similar 
to the reinforcement term in being a power-law decaying 
term.  However, this term only takes into account the most 
recent reference. Two new parameters have been added: a 
short-term decay rate ds and a time scaling parameter ts. 
Figure 7 displays the effect of this new term on the base-
level activation and the effect of the new parameters.  The 
first curve (BLL) displays the standard base-level curve, 
linear in log-log space.  The second curve (PL(0.75;10)) 
displays  the  new  base-level  learning  with  a  short-term 
decay rate of 0.75 (compared to the standard decay rate of 
0.5) and a time-scaling parameter of 10.  The proper effect 
seems  to  be  generated  but  too  weakly.    The  third  curve 
(PL(1.0;10))  shows  the  effect  of  increased  decay  on  the 
short-term inhibition, with a probability of retrieval at lag 1 
roughly equal to that at lag 100, and a peak around lag 10, 
as generally observed in the data of Figure 1.  The third 
curve (PL(1.0;5)) shows that decreasing the time scaling 
parameter from 10 to 5 effectively moves that peak from 
around lag 10 to around lag 5.  It seems that the parameters 
of  the  second  curve  (short-term  decay  of  1.0  and  time 
scaling  constant  of  10)  are  about  right.    The  final  two 
curves (PL(3;1.0;10) and PL(2;1.0;10)) show the effect of 
assuming multiple past references (3 and 2 times as many, 
respectively) as the original curve.  One can see that the 
power  law  of  practice  is  maintained  at  long  lags 
(significantly  above  10)  while  the  difference  is 
significantly  reduced  at  short  lags.    The  peak  lag  also 
seems  to  increase  slightly  with  practice.    All  of  these 
effects reproduce the data quite well (see previous figures). 
 
Figure 7: Inhibition effect of new base-level learning 
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main issue is identifying a neural construct this term can be 
associated with.  The most direct interpretation would be to 
associate it with short-term depotentiation known to inhibit 
a neuron for a short period of time after its firing.  Under 
that  view,  the  short-term  decay  rate  is  simply  another 
instance on a very small time scale of past proposals to 
introduce  multiple  decay  rates  in  long-term  memory 
corresponding to different time scales (Anderson, Fincham 
& Douglass, 1999), albeit here of an inhibitory nature. But 
another interpretation would be to associate this short-term 
inhibition  of  recently  accessed  information  with  its 
presence  in  short-term  memory  rather  than  its  access  in 
long-term  memory.    Under  that  interpretation,  what  is 
preventing the chunk from being retrieved from long-term 
memory  is  not  that  it  couldn’t  be  accessed  there,  but 
instead that it is still active in short-term memory, where 
access  is  much  quicker  and  can  therefore  preempt  the 
process of retrieval from long-term memory.  The short-
term decay rate is therefore the rate of decay in short-term 
memory, which is usually assumed to be much faster than 
that of long-term memory (e.g., Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). 
Behavior 
The next question is to determine the effectiveness of this 
mechanism in generating appropriate behavior as a part of 
the overall architecture.  In a simple model of free recall 
where a number of chunks compete for retrieval without 
any  constraint,  this  new  equation  has  been  effective  at 
preventing  out-of-control  looping  and  implementing  a 
functional, if probabilistic, version of round-robin access.  
This capability for declarative retrieval is similar to that 
exhibited by a model of procedural selection that learned 
production  rule  utilities  to  implement  a  flexible  and 
probabilistic  monitoring  loop  (Lebiere  et  al,  2008).  
Gradual, seamless transition from declarative to procedural 
control is a hallmark of human cognition.  An important 
benefit of this new form of the base-level learning equation 
is to provide the activation calculus in declarative retrieval 
with  the  same  sort  of  inhibition  available  to  procedural 
selection through error-correction feedback in production 
rule  utilities.  However,  it  is  relatively  easy  to  show 
robustness  (or  at  least  non-pathological  behavior)  under 
careful  control  conditions  as  implemented  by  a 
combination of the task model and its environment.  What 
we  are  looking  for  is  greater  robustness  that  prevents 
degenerate behavior even when very little or no control is 
exerted upon the model behavior by the control structure 
provided  by  the  modeler  or  by  the  environment  itself 
(including  other  agents).    That  is,  we  want  an  emergent 
robustness that does not originate from the model control 
structure  authored  by  the  modeler  or  that  depends  on 
triggers present in the environment (e.g. in experimental 
design) but instead that results directly from the cognitive 
architecture  and  its  mechanisms.    Having  this  kind  of 
safeguard  in  the  architecture  would  greatly  relieve  the 
burden  of  the  cognitive  modelers  and  allow  the 
development of larger, smarter and more complex models 
capable of unanticipated (reasonable) behavior. 
We therefore put the new base-level learning mechanism 
to a stringent test of robustness.  Since the problem is out-
of-control retrieval loops, and the traditional solution is a 
combination  of  chunk  tagging  (or  finsts)  with 
corresponding  constraints  on  retrieval,  we  focused  on  a 
model of free recall (unconstrained by the environment).  
The  model  is  given  a  fixed  set  of  chunks  and  asked  to 
retrieve any chunk without any constraints repeatedly (for 
a large number of times).  Each chunk starts with the same 
initial history, and hence the same activation.  The current 
base-level learning mechanism would immediately lead to 
a loop in which the same chunk would be retrieved over 
and over again while all the other ones would be forgotten.  
With  our  new  base-level  mechanism,  however,  we 
observed that a robust and flexible process of round-robin 
retrieval  emerged.    Figure  8  displays  the  frequencies  of 
free  recall  of  each  chunk  as  a  function  of  each  chunk’s 
rank order of retrieval frequency and the total number of 
recall iterations (varying from 100 to 1000 for 10 chunks). 
 
Figure 8: Frequencies of recall as function of item rank 
 
The results are quite intriguing.  The free recall behavior 
is neither the traditional degenerate winner-take-all nor its 
opposite,  which  would  be  an  even  distribution  of  recall 
frequencies over all chunks.  This second extreme, a kind 
of perfect round-robin, would be cognitively implausible, 
as subjects in free recall experiments do forget some items 
and retrieve some multiple times.  It might also be less than 
perfectly functional, since some items might deserve more 
frequent retrieval as a function of their characteristics such 
as  urgency  or  rate  of  change  (e.g.  Lebiere  et  al,  2008).  
Instead, what emerges is a distribution of frequencies that 
slowly  grows  more  uneven  as  the  number  of  free  recall 
iterations  gets  larger.    Stronger  items  slowly  emerge  as 
some are gradually forgotten.  What is more remarkable is 
that the frequency distribution seems to follow the power 
law observed in many natural environments, which is at the 
core of the base-level learning equation itself.  While this 
may  seem  natural,  it  was  not  at  all  a  given  since,  for 
example,  the  previous  base-level  learning  equation  that 
also reflected those distributions did not give rise to them 
2382but  instead  led  to  degenerate,  extreme  distributions.  
Instead, finding one possible origin of this phenomenon in 
the  cognitive  system  itself  might  provide  one  important 
piece of puzzle that has fascinated cognitive scientists for 
decades (e.g. Simon, 1955) and is increasingly viewed as 
resulting  from  an  interaction  of  the  environment  and 
human cognition itself (e.g., Manin, 2008). 
Conclusion 
It  is  important  to  note  the  limitations  of  these  results.  
First and foremost, full validation of this new mechanism 
requires  showing  that  it  can  account  directly  for  precise 
behavioral data, which we intend to do by taking existing 
models  of  memory  phenomena  and  removing  the 
safeguards handcrafted into them by modelers to prevent 
degenerate behaviors, and showing that previous results are 
preserved.  Also, our rational analysis approach does not 
claim  that  this  inhibition  mechanism  created  these 
environmental  effects,  rather  that  our  cognitive 
mechanisms have adapted to them.  However, while other 
mechanisms  (e.g.  application  of  grammatical  and 
arithmetic rules) might also be responsible for our overall 
cognitive  performance  in  these  tasks,  the  new  inhibition 
mechanism definitely facilitates that performance.  Finally, 
one can wonder whether those external task characteristics 
(e.g. grammatical rules against repetition, choice of base 
10 arithmetic) might not have themselves evolved to reflect 
pre-existing cognitive characteristics. Such a determination 
would require modeling alternative task variants as well as 
performing the same analysis in more naturalistic domains. 
We  have  presented  data  that  demonstrate  the  reduced 
short-term likelihood of recent items appearing again in the 
environment and an extension to the ACT-R architecture 
that  reflects  this  likelihood  and  produces  more  robust 
behavior than it did previously.  We are currently exploring 
a number of additional lines of study.  Empirically, we aim 
to replicate our findings in other human environments such 
as  computer  navigation,  web  environments  and  spatial 
navigation.    Neurally,  we  aim  to  find  correlates  of 
inhibition  in  mechanisms  such  as  short-term 
depotentiation.  Behaviorally, we want to understand better 
how  this  new  mechanism  interacts  with  the  rest  of  the 
architecture and which other emergent effects it might give 
rise to, such as the spacing effect. This approach underlies 
our belief that applying multiple constraints to architectural 
mechanisms is the best way to satisfy both scientific goals 
such  understanding  human  behavior  and  practical  goals 
such as developing more robust cognitive models. 
References 
Anderson,  J.  R.  (1990).  The  Adaptive  Character  of 
Thought. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Anderson, J. R., Fincham, J. M. & Douglass, S. (1999). 
Practice and retention: A unifying analysis. Journal of 
Experimental  Psychology:  Learning,  Memory,  and 
Cognition, 25, 1120-1136. 
Anderson,  J.  R.,  &  Lebiere,  C.  (1998).    The  Atomic 
Components  of  Thought.    Mahwah,  NJ:  Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates. 
Anderson, J. R. & Schooler, L. J. (1991). Reflections of the 
environment in memory. Psychological Science, 2, 396-
408. 
Anderson,  J.  R.  &  Schooler,  L.  J.  (2000).  The  adaptive 
nature  of  memory.  In  E.  Tulving  and  F.  I.  M.  Craik 
(Eds.)    Handbook  of  memory,  557-570.  New  York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Anderson, J. R., Bothell, D., Byrne, M. D., Douglass, S., 
Lebiere, C., & Qin, Y . (2004). An integrated theory of 
the mind. Psychological Review 111, (4). 1036-1060. 
Huberman, B. A., Pirolli, P., Pitkow, J. E. & Lukose, R. M. 
(1998).    Strong  Regularities  in  World  Wide  Web 
Surfing. Science 280 , 5360, 95-97. 
Jones, R.M., Crossman, J. A., Lebiere, C., & Best, B. J. 
(2006).  An abstract language for cognitive modeling. In 
Proceedings  of  the  7th  International  Conference  on 
Cognitive Modeling. Trieste, Italy 
Jones,  R.,  Lebiere,  C.  &  Crossman,  J.  A.  (2007).  
Comparing  Modeling  Idioms  in  ACT-R  and  Soar.  In 
Proceedings  of  the  8th  International  Conference  on 
Cognitive Modeling.  Ann Arbor, MI. 
Lebiere, C. (1998). The dynamics of cognition: An ACT-R 
model of cognitive arithmetic. Ph.D. Dissertation. CMU 
Computer Science Dept Technical Report CMU-CS-98-
186.  Pittsburgh,  PA.  Available  at  http://reports-
archive.adm.cs.cmu.edu/ 
Lebiere,  C.,  Archer,  R.,  Warwick,  W.,  &  Schunk,  D. 
(2005)    Integrating  modeling  and  simulation  into  a 
general-purpose  tool.    In  Proceedings  of  the  11th 
International  Conference  on  Human-Computer 
Interaction.  July 22-27, 2005.  Las Vegas, NV. 
Lebiere,  C.,  Archer,  R.,  Best,  B.,  &  Schunk,  D.  (2007).  
Modeling  pilot  performance  with  an  integrated  task 
network and cognitive architecture approach.  In Foyle, 
D. & Hooey, B. (Eds.) Human Performance Modeling in 
Aviation.  Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
McDermott,  J.  &  Forgy,  C.  (1978).  Production  system 
conflict resolution strategies.  In D. A. Waterman & F. 
Hayes-Roth (Eds.), Pattern-Directed Inference Systems, 
177-199.  Academic Press. 
Manin, D.Y. (2008). Zipf’s law and avoidance of excessive 
synonymy.  Cognitive Science, 32(7), 1075-1098. 
Pylyshyn,  Z.W.  (1989).  The  role  of  location  indexes  in 
spatial perception: A sketch of the FINST spatial-index 
model. Cognition, 32, 65-97. 
Ridderinkhof,  K.  R.,  Ullsperger,  M.,  Crone,  E.  A.,  & 
Nieuwenhuis, S. (2004). The Role of the Medial Frontal 
Cortex  in  Cognitive  Control.  Science,  Vol.  306.  no. 
5695, pp. 443 – 447. 
Simon, H. A. (1955).  On a Class of Skew Distribution 
Functions.  Biometrika 42 (3-4): 425–440. 
Young,  R.  M.  (2003).    Should  ACT-R  include  rule 
refraction?  In Proceedings of the Tenth Annual ACT-R 
Workshop.  Pittsburgh, PA. 
2383